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Abstract:  This article argues that the debate concerning the nature of the corporation is 
not finished and nor a mere intellectual exercise for interested legal academics.  The 
current model of the corporation as an economic entity—the firm—has a number of 
imbedded value assumptions.  Given the common territory between corporate law and 
economics, some scholars have come to identify the two as equal partners striving for the 
same ends.  This is a serious error which has had and continues to have significant 
negative consequences for both the economic situation of the majority and justice in 
society.  These value assumptions are being seriously brought into question in light of 
developing economic experience and analysis.  In light of experience, the values are far 
from being universally accepted.  Furthermore, they do not promote a just society.  
Models of the corporation are fundamental to the debate because models are both 
descriptive and prescriptive.  For society to develop on just lines, the debate of the 
fundamental values needs to be brought into the open and brought under closer scrutiny.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE MODELS: ECONOMIC AND 
JURISPRUDENTIAL VALUES AND THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
Every school of thought is like a man who has talked to himself for a hundred 
years and is delighted with his own mind, however stupid it may be.
J.W. Goethe, 1817, Principles of Natural Science
1 INTRODUCTION
Corporate law scholar, D. Millon, in his article “The Ambiguous Significance of 
Corporate Personhood”1 argues that much of the current debate among scholars 
concerning the correct or most appropriate model of the corporation is misguided.  He 
argues that the debate is misguided because it contributes little to the understanding of the 
actual use and operation of the corporation in today’s economy.  Further, it does not jibe 
with current jurisprudence which seems to have settled on a particular efficiency based 
model.2  Hence, to the extent that the purpose of having the correct model for the 
corporation is understanding actual use and operation of the corporation, he may be 
correct.  
One approach to the corporate model debate includes a review of the history of the 
corporation, noting its privileged and public beginnings, the shift to the registration and 
1
 D. Millon, “The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood”, Washington and Lee Public Law and 
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 01-6, Jan., 2001. 
2
 See comment of ,William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 1395, 1399 (1993).
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limited liability corporations followed by the separation of management and 
shareholders.3 Focusing on such things as legal fictions and nineteenth century legal 
developments, however, hardly informs or guides issues of the twenty first century.  
Another approach to the debate, largely informed by political views, is the debate 
between contractarian and progressive corporate law scholars.4
An effort to unravel the twisted jurisprudence is unlikely to be fruitful either, as the 
historical model debate demonstrates.  The reality is that the corporation is a firm—a 
group of people organized to raise funds and operate a profitable business.5
These views, however, fail to go far enough into the issue.  The issue is not “what is the 
corporation”?  For to describe what is is not the same as to say what should be.  This 
article commences with an examination of what is, and in particular, the model it is based 
on.  It will then examine the values and assumptions underlying the model, and see how it
has met its values or objectives.  It will then examine its short-comings.  Next it will turn 
to the future and see where corporations are going, asking if our model will be adequate 
to deal with those additional challenges.  Finally we will propose a few modifications that 
a new model should perhaps include.
3
 This approach seems to be more common among British and Australian corporate law scholars.  See for 
examples, J. Dine, The Governance of Corporate Groups, (2000), S. Bottomley, “From Contractualism to 
Constitutionalism: A Framework for Corporate Governance” (1997) Sydney LR at p. 277, J. Farrar, 
“Frankenstein Incorporated or Fool’s Parliament? Revisiting the Concept of the Corporation in Corporate 
Governance” (1998) 10 Bond LR at p. 161
4
 See P. Cox “The Public, The Private and The Corporation,” (1997) 80 Marq. L. Rev. 391and S. 
Bainbridge , “Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate 
Law Scholarship.” 82 Cornell L. Rev. 856
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2 ECONOMICS: THE DISCIPLINE
Over the course of its brief history, economics has developed into a social science dealing 
with decision making and in particular, with predicting behaviour.  It is essentially the 
science developed to analyze the utility of resources is economics, or perhaps more 
properly, the science of allocation under conditions of scarcity.6 Although American 
economics has by and large failed to address the epistemological problems inherent to all 
science,7 it has provided valuable insight into and support for decisions concerning 
creating a better society.
Economists generally assume a utilitarian approach,8 using theoretical beings in 
developing models about the way the world works.9  It is a long-standing and famous 
criticism of economics that its modeling and theory are quite removed from experience.10
As Nobel Laureate in economics, Ronald Coase, observed: 
5
 R. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” 4 Economia (1937) (NS) 386.
6 Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, (1932).
7
 The dearth of postmodern criticism of economics and general lack of requisite reflection on the 
foundations of the discipline are nearly incredible to humanists.  For an encouraging and interesting 
tentative step in this direction, see Oxford economist, John Kay’s musings “Postmodernism, Rationality 
Management” 7 March, 2001 Financial Times.  Europeans have addressed these issues in more depth, 
particularly in the philosophy of science debate running from Karl Popper, to Thomas Kuhn, and on to 
Lakatos.
8
 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 1962, Yale, p. 16, and see Posner’s discussion comparing economics 
and utilitarianism in R. Posner, The Economics of Justice, 2nd ed. (1983), pp. 48-60.
9
 The rather extensive and at times overzealous use of assumptions in economics is a source of criticism 
both within and outside of the profession.  As Cooter and Ulen light-heartedly repeat the comment, “the 
economist’s predict was correct but the economy went wrong.”  In Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law 
and economics. 2nd ed., (1997), p. ix. 
10
 See the interesting analysis of economists’ mudslinging about theory in U. Maki, “Against Posner against 
Coase against theory.” (1998) 22 Cambridge Journal of Economics 587.
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Economics, over the years, has become more and more abstract and divorced 
from events in the real world.  Economist, by and large, do not study the workings 
of the actual economics system.  They theorize about it.  As Ely Devons, an 
English economist, once said at a meeting ‘If economists wished to study the 
horse, they wouldn’t go and look at horses.  They’d sit in their studies and say to 
themselves, “What would I do if I were a horse?”’11
Methodologically, economics works by establishing a point of reference and then 
adopting a value which it uses as a criterion for advocating or opposing a particular 
allocation, or predicting a particular behaviour.12 Economics can be either normative or 
positive.13  Normative economics includes a broad array of values, perspectives and 
approaches to the evaluation and allocation of society’s resources.  It includes the 
ecological14 and social values which are less often considered as part of traditional 
economic analysis, and is advocated and practiced by such noteworthy economists as 
Amarta Sen,15 and Karl Polyani.16  Normative economics, as represented by Ronald 
Coase17 as an example, evidences some humility, recognizing that economics is but one 
of many approaches to addressing the problems of society, and in particular, the 
economic problems of society.18  Coase, discussing economics’ movement into other 
11
 R. Coase, The Task of Society, quoted in H. de Soto, The Mystery of Capital, (2000) p. 15.
12
 See B. Hsiung’s excellent analysis of economic method in “The Success of Law and Economics: A 
Methodological Interpretation” (hereinafter, Success) pp. 7-10.
13
 For a simplified version, see Sir Richard Ivor’s discussion on the difference between descriptive and 
normative economics in law in his “Address to Inaugural Law and Economics Course” in the newsletter of 
Law & Economics Association of New Zealand, Sept. 1997, p. 3.  Economics is simply put, not well suited 
to making these types of society shaping judgments.  B. Hsiung’s “A Methodological Comparison of 
Ronald Coase and Gary Becker” (2001) American Law and Econ Rev. 186 (hereinafter Methodological) at
14
 See for example, R. Costanza,  What is ecological economics?  (1989) Ecological Economics 1(1): 1-7 
and M. Sagoff,  The Economy of the Earth:  Philosophy, Law, and the Environment.  (1988).
15
 A. Sen, On Ethics and Economics (1987)
16
 K. Polyani, The Great Transformation, (1944).
17
 R. Coase, “Economics and Contiguous Disciplines” (1978) 7 J. of Legal St., 201-211 at 206-207.
18
 Ibid and discussed and explained in Hsiung, Methodological, op cit, n.13, p. 188-189
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disciplines, offered:  “it would perhaps be more plausible to argue that economists are 
looking for fields in which they can have some success.”19
Positive economics was a reaction against some of the more philosophically minded 
economists of the last century.  Rather than focusing on theory, the positivists were 
concerned about what they could find in reality.  One branch of this school developed the 
popular neo-classical approach to economics.  Neo-classical economists claimed to be 
doing value free scientific inquiry and hence were not to be bound or judged by the 
philosophical mores or concerns of other economists.   We will turn to examine the value 
free science claim later in this paper.  For now, we will concentrate on neo-classical 
economics.
Neo-classical economics, contrary to their initial position, has moved a step beyond than 
positive economics by developing normative recommendations about how society should 
be organized and how resources should be allocated to meet those objectives.20  It starts 
with the assumptions that all human behaviour as exclusively self-interested—i.e. 
humans as no more than “rational utility maximizers”21—and that all interaction as 
efficiency driven—i.e. market driven to find the lowest monetary cost for all goods and 
services.  Indeed, Chicago economist Gary Becker states, “I am saying that the economic 
approach provides a valuable unified framework for understanding all human 
19
 R. Coase, “Economics and Contiguous Disciplines,” (1978) 7 J. Legal Studies 201 cited in B. Hsiung, 
Methodological, op cit, n. 13, p. 187, n. 2.
20
 For discussion of positive economics, see M. Friedman, “Positive Economics”, in The Philosophy of 
Economics, D. Hausman, ed (1990). pp 210-244.
21
 The famous homo economicus is what I am referring to.  For an economist’s criticism of this model of 
human behaviour see Thaler, R. “Homo Economicus,” (2000) Journal of Economic Perspectives , Volume 
14, Number 1, 133-141.
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behaviour.”22  Neo-classical economics, perhaps most commonly associated with the 
New Chicago School after the 1960’s23 looks at the increase in wealth as the ultimate 
objective of social organization.24  Where an action results in increased total wealth, the 
transaction should be transacted, regardless of the desires of the parties.25
The New Chicago School commonly uses Kaldor-Hicksian efficiency as the normative-
standard to evaluate economic “institutions”.  This is a normative form of economics 
whereby a dollars worth of value is the same across all persons.  At this point, of course, 
economists are no longer engaged in positive economics; rather, they are implicitly 
validating the existing distribution of wealth and obviously, where this is the agenda, they 
will oppose any attempt at reallocation or “rent-seeking and rent-keeping.”  What makes 
this argument a difficult one to engage is that in practice normative and positive 
economics get conflated, and particularly so by neo-classical economists who claim to be 
doing value-free science.26  In the name of efficiency, following Kaldor-Hicks, they 
advocate that where an action results in increased total wealth, the transaction should be 
transacted, regardless of the desires of the parties.27  This takes the form of a rule for the 
22
 G. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour, (1976), p. 14. Although not all Economists 
agree with Becker in this respect, most would agree that one can explain much “social” and “political” 
behavior by reference to the pursuit of one’s self-interest. 
23
 For a review of economic intellectual history, see Robert Heilbroner’s The Worldly Philosophers.  For a 
brief summary of the Chicago School, see New School of Social Research’s history of economics website: 
http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/schools/chicago.htm
24
 See for example, Pareto efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks theorems.  See also Posner’s discussion Econ of Just, 
op cit, n., 8 pp. 88-119.
25
 Kaldor-Hicks as applied in Calabresi and Malamed’s view of property law in , Property Rules, Liability 
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, (1972) 85 Harvard L. Rev., 1089.
26
 See for example, Pareto efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks theorems.  See also Posner’s discussion Econ of Just, 
op cit, n. 8, pp. 88-119.  Concerning the conflation of positive and normative economics, see D. Hausen 
and M. McPherson, “Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and Contemporary  Moral Philosophy,” (1993) 
31 J. of Economic Literature, 671-731, 673.
27
 Kaldor-Hicks as applied in Calabresi and Malamed’s op cit, n. 25.
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allocation of property-rights discussed elsewhere in the law and economics literature.28
With the existence of transaction costs for their redistribution, the right should be 
assigned to the party that values it most initially.  
If we return to Hsiung’s methodological discussion, we recognize a dramatic difference 
between the two approaches.  Hsiung pointed out the central role of value selection—
referred to by Posner as “frame of reference”29—in determining the nature of the 
economic project.  Whereas most normative and positivist economists are open to 
alternative values, neo-classicists have selected their one value and closed the door to 
other values.  Selecting a value and developing knowledge has moved from being mere 
descriptive, normative economics, to positivist economics.  This selection and total 
rejection of alternative values by the neo-classical economists is highly inappropriate and 
amounts to dishonesty in the academy.  As noted economist Robert Heilbroner observes: 
“what is essential, then, is to become aware of one’s socio-political values, not to pretend 
they do not exist.”30  He goes on to note: “economics, in its ‘purest’ form is intrinsically 
and inescapably ideological.”31
The discipline most suited to developing value judgments can hardly be mathematically 
focused economics. Rather, those types of judgments are properly the province of 




 Noted and discussed in Hsiung, Success, op cit, n. 12 p. 10, n. 33.
30
 R. Hielbroner, “Vision and Analysis in the History of Economic Thought” in Pier Porta et al, eds. (2001) 
Knowledge, Social Institutions and Division of Labour. Pp. 54-63, at p. 61.
31
 Ibid, at p. 63.
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and the humanities, it abandoned that approach in favour of a scientific methodology.32
If economists wish to continue to make value decisions within the academy, they must 
abandon their claim to be conducting scientific study and producing scientific knowledge.  
Undoubtedly, the philosophers would be delighted to further participants in their 
engaging debates.
Nevertheless, if we examine neo-classical economics from a methodological perspective, 
we find that the neo-classicist economists have selected efficiency as the primary value of 
society.33  All other values, including justice, mercy, and happiness come second, if at 
all.34  Once having made this value judgment, further discussions of right and wrong, 
moral or immoral are ignored or dismissed as meaningless.35  While appropriate for a 
science to dismiss such discussion, at least in some views36 it is questionable 
methodologically to deny or stifle the a priori value debate in science, particularly where 
the selection of values is at the foundation of the method and therefore determinative of 
outcomes.37  It is generally recognized, however, that efficiency is not an ultimate end.  It 
is an immediate end.  So, for example, the value of efficiency in killing a group of people 
targeted for execution depends on the perspective.  From the perspective of the killers, 
32 Heilbroner, op cit, n. 23.
33
 Hsiung, Success, op cit, n. 12, p. 14, notes “For economists, using efficiency as the criterion of judgment 
is almost beyond dispute.”
34
 While scientists can hardly be faulted for not addressing such values, the issue of economic science, 
which deals with such issues, is called into question as we shall see later.  Posner has dealt with happiness 
in his readable and thoughtful criticism of utilitarianism; however, his wealth maximization principle does 
not address this issue any better—perhaps a criticism he himself recognized.  See The Econ of Justice, p. 
52.
35
 See for example, R. Posner, “1997 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Problematics of Moral and 
Legal Theory,” (1998) 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1637.
36
 The problem here is whether or not one accepts science as value-free.
37
 This stronger view of the role of the researcher’s bias interestingly finds its roots in the natural sciences, 
and particularly with the phenomenon of researcher observation creating the phenomena in subatomic 
particle physics.
Importance of Corporate Models 
Final  Ed.
12
efficiency is an important value. From the perspective of the victims, inefficiency is the 
highest value.  The value of efficiency, therefore, depends on the ends which it seeks to 
achieve.
For neo-classical economists, such as Chicago’s Friedman quoted above, the ultimate 
end—the increased monetary wealth in society38—is the sole, exclusive and ultimate 
Good.39  Accordingly, all their prescriptions for social organization and order revolves 
exclusively around increasing wealth (or at least utility) by increasing efficiency.40  Any 
brake on efficiency is seen as wrong, erroneous, unscientific, and directing society down 
the wrong path.  It is “irrational.”41  If scientists were to use the language of ethics—
which they sometimes slip into—they would argue that inefficiency is an immoral, evil 
waste of money. As such, economics tends to be limited to discussion of things that can 
be monetized.42  While this limitation is insignificant in the discussion of economy, there 
can hardly be anything more significant to a discussion of human life.  Health, happiness, 
family, friends and a sense of fulfillment—the most important things in life—simply are 
38
 Views clarified and argued by R. Posner, Econ of Just, op cit, n. 8.
39
 See Posner’s chapter 3 of Econ of Just, op cit, n. 8, in which he sets out his theory of “wealth 
maximization” and specifically deals with it in chapter 4 “The Ethical and Political Basis of Wealth 
Maximization” as an ethical theory, in Posner, Econ of Just., op cit, n. 8, pp. 48-115 and  in Malloy and 
Posner in “Debate: Is Law and Economics Moral?” 24 Val. U. L Rev. 147.  Interestingly, in his 1997 
Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures he denies completely having ethical concerns.  His most distinguished 
opponent, R. Dworkin, challenges the views expressed in the Holmes Lectures in R. Dworkin, “Darwin’s 
New Bulldog,”  (1998) 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1718. 
40
 To argue the opposite—that a society should be organized around creating inefficiency—fails to grasp 
the point of the discussion.  The issue is not whether efficiency is an important value.  Rather, the concern 
is whether is should be the sole or ultimate value or organizing principle of a society.
41 Before concluding that it is “irrational”, however, one must consider the nature of rationality in 
economics, and in particular bounded rationality.  Given the limited and imperfect character of the 
information we possess and the developing understanding of fuzzy concepts and chaos theory, conclusions 
about “irrationality” should carry a significant caveat—namely, that a choice or decision may be 
“irrational” but only so in the model being used.
42
 See discussion of money and monetary system in H. de Soto, The Mystery of Capital, (2000) NY, Basic 
Books, pp. 43-44, 63.
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not subject to monetization.43  Neo-classical positive economics tends to lack the 
humility of normative economics and is subject to the criticism of “economic 
imperialism.”44
Thus, while efficiency is clearly an important value,45 it can hardly be the fundamental or 
organizing value or principle of a society.46  In Sir Richard Ivor’s understatement: “A 
society where everyone is intent on maximizing their own wealth has its limitations.”47
Efficiency may require killing off the excess humans or enslaving some other humans.48
43
 Both Posner and Becker recognize the difficulty and overriding importance of non-monetized events and 
values.  They have taken different approaches in dealing with them.  Posner has acknowledge them, but 
largely been silent (see Econ of Justice, p. 64).  Becker, by way of contrast, has applied his method even to 
such thorny issues as marriage, family and free time.  The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, 
(1976).
44
 R. Swedberg, Economics and Sociology. In addition, for a criticism of the economic analysis of law, see, 
for instance, R. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value? 9 J. Legal Stud. 191 (1980); R. Malloy, Law and Economics: 
A Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice (1990); R. Epstein, Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past 
and Cloudy Future, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1167 (1997); and N. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The 
Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1197 (1997).  As observed 
by economist, Abba Lerner, “Economics has gained the title of queen of the social science by choosing 
solved political problems as its domain.” “The Economics and Politics of Consumer Soverignty,” 62(2) 
American Economics Review, (1972), 258-266, cited in  S. Bowles ad H. Gintis, “Revenge of Homo 
Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy.”  7(1) J. of Econ. Perspectives, 
83-102, (1993) p. 86.
45
 Hsiung observes that “For economists, using efficiency as the criterion of judgment is almost beyond 
dispute, but for some legal scholars at least, they find it difficult to accept the idea of efficiency as applied 
to studying legal studies.”  Success, op cit, n. 12, p. 14.
46
 Societies have been organized around religion, social class, social relationships, artistic ability, warriors’ 
power etc.  It is important to recognize that each of these societies considered itself to be “the best, most 
advanced etc.”.  This recognition must bring a bit of humility to our evaluation of our economically driven 
society.  See F. Fukuyama’s The End of History and The Last Man, and particularly his concluding chapter.
47
 “Address to Inaugural” op cit, n. 13, p. 3.  Posner would argue not only that it is possible, but that society 
in fact does organize itself and its laws on the basis of efficiency. See his chapters “A Theory of Primitive 
Society” and  “The Economic Theory of Primitive Law” in Economics of Justice, pp. 146-173 and 174-206 
respectively. 
48
 Posner recognizes this as a valid criticism of traditional utilitarian based economics in Econ of Just, n. 8, 
p. 54.  While his theory successfully dodges this problem with utilitarianism, its error is equally egregious 
if not more pernicious in restricting all discussion and allocation of the world’s resources to those with the 
sufficient economic resources to acquire them.  Posner argues that he and his fellow court of appeal judges 
are just average, ordinary citizens.  It is hard to imagine how a person who could afford a minimum of 
seven years education, practice law for the requisite period earning an average lawyer’s salary, and have 
the political connections and prestige to be appointed appeal court judges are to be considered simply the 
average person.  For further discussion and a more fundamental criticism of Posner’s view see those raised 
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Even neo-classicist Friedman acknowledges efficiency cannot be the driving force of 
society.  He wrote, “I would favor a free society even if it were less productive than some 
alternative—say a slave society… because my basic value is freedom itself.”49
Nevertheless, neo-classical economists ignore other just such values, the values usually 
considered in economics, namely, freedom, security, justice and welfare.50
3 LAW AND ECONOMICS
The role of economics in legal analysis has blossomed since Coase’s critical 1960 
contribution “The Problem of Social Cost,”51 for understandable reasons and with good 
results.52  In fact, it has developed to the point that, as one scholar puts it: “economic 
analysis in legal scholarship has become so de rigueur that even those who refuse to view 
economics as the Holy Grail of knowledge are compelled to use economics in their 
scholarship.”53  Economics, adopted by law and economics scholars, tends to be neo-
classical economics with its driving value, efficiency.54  These neo-classical positive 
by N. Siegel, “Sen and the Hart of Jurisprudence: A Critique of the Economic Analysis of Judicial 
Behavior,” (2000) 87 Calif. L. Rev. 1581.
49
 M. Friedman, “Free Markets and Free Speech,” 10 Harvard J. Law & Pub. Pol’y 1 (1987).  But to be 
consistent, should not Friedman then be developing an economics based on freedom as the ultimate value 
instead of efficiency?
50 Interestingly, one of the supposed champions of neo-classical economists, von Mises considered these 
values as important and important in economic analysis.  His concerns for these values tend to be 
completely missed by his later admirers who take him to be a neo-liberal, neo-conservative economist 
without social concern.  The issues related to social costs were first brought up by Arthur Cecil Pigou 
which he addressed as externalities.
51
 R. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” (1960) 111 Journal of Law of Economics, 1.
52
 For an enlightening discussion of this phenomenon, see B. Hsiung, Success, op cit, n. 12.  
53
 A. Seita, “Common Myths in the Economic Analysis of Law,” (1989) B.Y.U. L. Rev. 993, 995-997.
54
 See for a general discussion of the development of economics in expending beyond the Economics 
Department, and particularly, into law, B. Hsiung, Success, op cit n. 12.  A review of the general law and 
economics literature leads one to the conclusion of the efficiency value.  See, for example, some of the 
criticisms of law and economics raised by Robin Paul Malloy, Law and Market Economy: Reinterpreting 
the Values of Law and Economy, (2001) Cambridge University Press.  For a remarkably insightful and 
thorough article concerning the a priori philosophical and political values and commitments of scholars and 
relating them to corporate law, see Cox, op cit n. 4.
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economists of law and economics scholarship posit one form of efficiency, wealth 
maximization, as the fundamental principle of social organization.55
Nevertheless this meeting of law and very limited, outdated56 neo-classical positive 
economics57 is seen by some law and economics scholars, including no less a noteworthy 
than Judge Posner,58 to be the ideal.  In the view of those law and economics scholars, 
law is the practical application or implementation of economic science and positive 
55 The obsession with size in America, and particularly the idea that larger is better, is subject to many 
criticisms.  In this particular case, one cannot but help make the analogy of craniometry—the “science” of 
brain size, founded by Paul Broca and Samuel Morton, and the “science” of wealth maximization where in 
both instances bigger is “better” without a deep understanding what “better” really is.  Craniometry 
disappeared from the academy when it was realized and admitted that the evidence did not bear out the 
hypothesis.  One can only hope that the neo-classicists will have the integrity and graciousness to take note 
of the evidence and follow that example.
56
 See criticisms below concerning postmodernism and economics.  Also, see Amartya Sen’s criticism of 
the mechanistic method to economic analysis applied by contemporary economic theory which method he 
sees as its “major deficiency.” In Ethics and Economics, (1987)  p. 28.
57
 The dearth of postmodern criticism of economics and general lack of requisite reflection on the 
foundations of the discipline are nearly incredible to humanists.  For an encouraging and interesting 
tentative step in this direction, see Oxford economist, John Kay’s musings “Postmodernism, Rationality 
Management” 7 March, 2001 Financial Times.  See also R. Rossini Favretti “Interpretation and 
Representation in the Discourse of Economics”, in P. Porta et al Knowledge, Social Institutions and the 
Division of Labour (2001) Northampton, USA.
58
 In much of the discussion that follows, I have taken Posner as the leading exemplar of law and 
economics positivists.   As will be evident, my disagreement with Posner about the correct location of 
efficiency in the schemata of social values, leads to a number of criticisms of his positions.  I have made an 
effort not to fall into the error some scholars engaged in the debate who tend to argue with caricatures of 
other positions rather than the real positions—an error identified by Cox  Cox, n. 4, p. 401 Instead, I have 
developed my criticisms from reading of Posner.  In my reading of Posner’s work his views appear to have 
become reified, more extreme and hence less nuanced over time.  This trend makes it more difficult to 
access and assess his later work and accordingly, most of the discussion below deals with his earlier work, 
The Economics of Justice.  My disagreement with Posner’s thinking and views should not be read as a 
denigration of his clever and thoughtful consideration of the issues he touches.  It is an intellectual 
disagreement, with openness to competing values, much as he demonstrated in his earlier writings.  At this 
time in his career, although not value-free as none of us are, at least he appeared open to considering 
alternative values, and it is in this spirit that I intend to offer this work and criticism.  As Cunningham in his 
thorough and critical analysis of Posner’s claims notes: “no single view or approach endorsed by all 
proponents of economic analysis of the legal system, one viewpoint has remained the most prominent—that 
of Judge Richard Posner.”  W. Cunningham, “Testing Posner’s Strong Theory of Wealth Maximization.” 
(1992) 81 Geo. L.J. 141. A legitimate argument could be made that Richard Epstein also of Chicago and 
the most cited law and economics legal scholar should serve as exemplar. 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings02/most_cited.html My reason for focusing on Posner is 
his long career, his efforts to balance and consider his thinking in light of his judicial practice, his 
prominence in the Law and economics approach as just noted, and his efforts to communicate his views to 
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economic policy.  Law is but the tool for balancing the utility of various competing 
claims and is best suited among society’s tools for making decisions about those 
divisions, giving rise to and increasing society’s overall wealth.  The general idea is to 
bring scientific certainty, objectivity and impartiality to legal decisions.59  Law allocates 
costs to where it is most efficient to do so60 regardless of where they can be most easily 
absorbed.  Corporate law, according to this view, as one spoke in the wheel of overall 
society, is to be developed, interpreted and applied extrapolating along this line for the 
exclusive purpose of  increasing the economic output and wealth of society. 
The economic role of the corporation tends to be the focus of analysis when one has 
come to the conclusion that the corporation is an economic arrangement or organization, 
and that corporate law is about increasing efficiency whether in the market, through such 
things as disclosure legislation and securities, or in terms of the overall welfare of society 
fulfilling the obligations of business.61  As argued famously Nobel Laureate in 
Economics, Milton Friedman, the social good achieved by a corporation is producing a 
profit.  As he wrote in his controversial 1970 article: 
the one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and 
engage in activities designed to increase its profits…. Few trends could so 
thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance 
the non-academic universe make him an important voice for the positivist economics perspective among 
the populous.
59
 Robin Paul Malloy, Law and Market Economy: Reinterpreting the Values of Law and Economy, (2001) 
Cambridge University Press, p. 5.  Again, the idea of any science, let alone a social science, being certain, 
objective or value-free, no longer has credibility.  The foundational work criticizing economic’s pretensions 
to being value-free science was done by R. Heilbroner. “Economics as ‘Value Free’ Science”  40 Soc. Res. 
129 (1973).  See discussion of postmodernism above Rossini Favretti, op cit n. 57.  See also the discussion 
of Critical Theory in D. Braybrooke, The Philosophy of Social Science (1987) and various Critical Legal 
Studies theorists such as Kennedy.
60
 Calabresi op cit, n. 25. This is the fundamental contribution of Coase in “The Problem of Social Costs” 
op cit n. 51.
61
 See for example M. Jensen, “Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Function.” 
(Fall, 2001) 14 (3) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance .
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by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money 
for their stockholders as possible. 62
He argues that the fundamental freedom of society is properly equated with the 
unadulterated, unmitigated pursuit of shareholder wealth.63
Unfortunately, the positive economics and law approach fails to notice a critical and very 
fundamental difference between law and economics.  As Joseph Singer puts it, drawing 
from T.H. White’s character Balin “There is something important in humanity… I cannot 
at present describe it.”64 Singer identifies the issue of fairness as one of law’s particular 
contributions to society and suggests, among other things, that the answers proposed by 
economists65 fail to meet some fundamental needs and desires of human nature.
4 LAW AND SOCIAL VALUES
Is arbitration of disputes with an eye to increasing of societal wealth the total or whole 
and complete role of law?  Such a view would hardly appeal to the average citizen.66
Indeed, from the perspective of the average citizen law that only adds and subtracts 
wealth would be exceedingly strange.  The courthouses are not called the House of 
Economics and nor do the scales in the hands of the blindfolded Goddess of Justice, 
62
 “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits,” NY Times Magazine, Sept. 13, 1970, at
32-33, 122, 124, 126.
63
 A similar view is taken up by business scholars Michael Jensen and William Meckling in an alarmist, 
radical, and in hindsight clearly incorrect, article “Between Freedom and Democracy” (Oct. 1977) The 
Banker available at SSRN Electronic Library. 
64
 T. White, The Book of Merlyn, quoted in J. Singer, “Something Important in Humanity” (2002) 37 Harv. 
C.R. C.L. L. Rev. 103. 
65 Singer’s concern is with welfare economics, and in particular the work of L. Kaplow and S. Shavell 
Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001).  See Singer ibid.
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Themis, contain gold coins or stacked dollar bills.67  Rather, the scales hold a human 
heart.  These figures are symbols of something different from economics and efficiency.  
It is something we call justice. The difficulty of defining the term, although notorious, 
need not force us to declare it meaningless and throw up our hands in defeat.  Rather, it is 
a vague term—a term that by definition is not wholly or readily definable.68
Law is concerned not only with economic efficiency, but with things we call retribution, 
personal responsibility,69 fairness,70 and a just society.71  It is a discipline extending well 
beyond economic concerns72 looking to aspirations for individual human beings as well 
as for society as a whole.  Its framework is not and cannot be limited to maximizing 
wealth transactions.  As Sir Richard Ivor notes: “there are always policy trade-offs 
between efficiency, fairness and other individual and community values” with which law 
must concern itself.73  In particular, law cannot be limited to a discussion of how to 
organize and protect those with wealth.74
66
 Both law and economics escape the grasp of the average citizen.  Law’s highly technical reasoning is 
simply beyond most people’s interest or ability, as Posner has noted, and economic analysis is either 
objectionable or in some models too technical, as Hsiung has noted, Success, op cit, n. 12. 
67
 Traditional representations of Themis have a human heart in the balance.
68
 On the growing recognition of importance of vagueness in science and mathematics, see the R. Sorenson, 
“Vagueness” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall Edition 2001) Edward N. Zalta (ed) 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall1999/entries/russell/
69
 The role of personal responsibility in the development of the human personality is central to much 
philosophy, from the idea of individual responsibility in Aristotle’s virtue ethics to the Existentialists’ angst 
and personal quest for meaning, as well as psychology including such thinkers as Karl Rogers and 
Abraham Maslow.
70
 Which includes of course, issues of distribution of resources, an activity greatly assisted by economic 
analysis.
71
 As Rawls observes, “A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; 
likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if 
they are unjust.”  Theory of Justice, p. 1. 
72
  See T. Ulen, “Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law” (1997) 3 Wis. L. Rev. 433 at p. 
436.
73
 “Address to Inaugural” op cit n 47, p. 1.
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Some readers may object that this article is not dealing with real law and economics 
scholars but a mere caricature.75  Consider, however, Posner’s explanation of value: “The 
most important thing to bear in mind about the concept of value is that it is based on what 
people are willing to pay for something rather than on the happiness they would derive 
from having it.”76  He goes on to explain: “The wealth of society is the aggregate 
satisfaction of those preferences (the only ones that have ethical weight in a system of 
wealth maximization) that are backed up by money.”77  Posner’s dismissal of those 
people without resources as not valuing goods is difficult to understand and morally 
unacceptable even by the society he purports to represent.  Recent pharmaceutical 
companies’ decision to supply HIV drugs at low cost because of public pressure suggests 
that maximizing social wealth is not a sufficient or acceptable organizing principal or 
value to many Americans.78
Does Posner truly expect people to believe that a starving person with no money places 
less value (in any recognizable sense of the word) on a loaf of bread than a wealthy 
person who happens to buy a loaf to feed the ducks?79  With a swipe of the pen Posner 
and some law and economics scholars have wiped off the concerns of 5.9 billion people 
74
 See Critical Legal Studies analysis of law as found, for example, 
75
 See criticism noted by Cox, op cit, n 4, (n. 47 mentions caricature)
76
 Posner, The Econ of Justice, p. 60.  Curiously, this explanation of wealth ignores the economic principle 
established by Daniel Bernoulli concerning the marginal utility of money.  That principle is that the value 
of each additional dollar is less than the one prior.
77
 Posner, the Econ of Justice, p. 61
78
 The drug industry escaped this fate when in 1995 it stopped producing eflornithine, the cure for sleeping 
sickness, because of the lack of public awareness of sleeping sickness and because it does not strike people 
in Northern climates.  It is estimated that the drug would save the 66,000 people who die of it annually.  
Production of the drug was restarted when pharmaceutical companies were able to commercialize its hari 
loss side-effects.  
79
 Dworkin’s criticism of Posner, noted in Econ of Just.
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because they lack the dollars necessary to purchase resources.80  Oddly, if one were to 
consider the issue from a broader perspective, these people have all the same rights, 
including property rights in the environment to such things as clean air and water that 
provide an economic contribution of more than $35 trillion81 to the world’s productive 
output of which America is a notoriously disproportionate non-paying (non-valuing, or 
perhaps, thief) over-consumer but nonetheless law and economics scholars dismiss. 
Law recognizes that human nature is not only self-interested nor wealth driven in a way 
that positive economics does not.82  For example, one need look no further than the Steve 
Martin character in the movie The Jerk.  In that movie, Martin plays a character who 
became fabulously wealthy as a result of a quirky invention.  In the course of the movie, 
the wealthy Martin marries, and later, as he looses his fortune, finds himself in a divorce.  
As he stumbles out of the mansion weeping, he grabs a few items that have meaning or 
“wealth” for him. He bawls; “All I want is this ashtray, my blanket and a pair of pants.”  
The money involved simply does not interest him.  
80
 Estimates of the world’s population are 6.5 billion, of whom 10% live a “developed” lifestyle—i.e. have 
the income necessary to support excess consumption.
81
 Figure from world renowned scientist and ecologist, David Suzuki, in “Suzuki offers 10 steps to save the 
planet” R. Cairney (January 10, 2003 ) Express News, University of Alberta.  
http://www.expressnews.ualberta.ca/expressnews/articles/news.cfm?p_ID=3646&s=a R. Constanza offers a 
range of $16 trillion to $54 trillion. et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural 
Capital, 387 NATURE 253 (1997) at 259 cited in D. Kysar,  Sustainability, Distribution, and the 
Macroeconomic Analysis of Law (2001) 43 B.C. L. Rev 1, at 40.
82
 Economics is not the “Imperial Science.”  Although it examines various aspects of human behaviour, it is 
not all determinative nor can it be.  Law and economics tends to use only one economic model of humans.  
These humans are singly motivated: they act only as “rational self-interested maximisers.”  Obviously, this 
model tends to be excessively reductionist.  Exacerbating the issue is its dogmatic application over what is 
likely too wide a scope.  See B. Hsuing “The Success of Law and Economics: A Methodological 
Interpretation”, available at  Law & Economics Association of New Zealand website, 
http://www.leanz.org.nz/SITE_Default/SITE_papers/default.asp  Other models which include a much 
broader approach to human behaviour and society, such as that of Amarta Sen, are simply not addressed. 
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The positive economist has difficulty explaining this action.  The lawyer acting for 
Martin, in order to avoid a negligence claim later would have to advise him to consider 
more carefully his economic rights.  Nevertheless, should Martin the client persist in this 
view, the lawyer should not substitute her view of justice, fairness or value for that of the 
client.  And the law must and does take account of these various value systems.   
Economics, at least as utilized by law and economics, cannot.83  As Hart has famously 
said, “law, however, is too important a  thing to be left to lawyers,”84 and Rorty the same 
concerning philosophers,85 it is undoubtedly true the underlying value judgments required 
in economics are too important to be left to the economists.
5 JURISPRUDENCE AND CORPORATE LAW
Bringing our discussion back to the corporation then, we can see that the economic 
analysis of the corporation does not take into account all of law’s separate objectives such 
as fairness and justice.  Further it fails to include plurality of values.  Even a modest 
review of current corporate law objectives in the United States suggests that a plurality of 
values forms the basis. Furthermore, these values are not at all in coincidence with one 
another: They conflict as they represent different values in the corporation, society and 
competing policies.  Millon, for example, argues that corporate law has at least four 
norms.  He suggests that it should: (1) promote stable relations between certain non-
shareholder constituencies and the corporation, (2) adjust the gains between shareholders 
83
 For a discussion of Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, see T. Ulen, Rational Choice and the 
Economic Analysis of Law, (1994) 19 L. & Soc. Inquiry 487.
84
 H.L.A. Hart,  “Bentham on Legal Rights,” in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (2nd Series) A. B. Simpson 
ed. (1973) reprinted in D. Lyons ed., Rights, (1979), p. 146.
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and non-shareholders, (3) address the fairness in allocation of transaction costs, and (4) 
look for ways to include in decision making those most directly effected by such 
decisions.86
Corporate law scholar Eric Orts observes the conflicting values in corporate law itself.  
He notes, for example, the divided economic object: profit vs. wealth, short vs. long term, 
central management vs. dispersed capital providers, capital accumulation, protection of 
investors, and the protection of other interests.87  He offers following the law as an 
objective in itself described as “modest idealism.”88  Orts even identifies the ethical 
dimension of corporate law that allows for the non-economic considerations of ethics and 
justice seen in such instruments as anti-takeover legislation.89  Following a remarkable 
and interesting analysis of corporate legal theory Orts observes:  
policies underlying corporate law cannot be reduced to a uni-dimensional value, 
such as the economic objective of ‘maximizing shareholders' wealth’ or even, 
more generally, ‘economic efficiency.’90
To narrowly limit discussion and consideration of corporate law to matters of economy 
and more specifically therefore is either an error or a blatant political choice.91  If it is a 
political choice, that choice must be put on the table and debated as such, instead of 
attempting to hide it under the cloak of objective science often translated into orthodox 
85
 R. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (1999).
86
 D. Millon, “New Directions In Corporate Law Communitarians, Contractarians, And The Crisis In 
Corporate Law,” 50 Wash & Lee L.R. Rev. 1373, at p. 1388.  
87
 Eric W. Orts, “The Complexity And Legitimacy Of Corporate Law” (Fall, 1993) Washington & Lee Law 
Review 50 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1565 (hereinafter Complexity ).
88
 R. Clark, “Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties,” in Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, 
55-79 (J. Pratt and R. Zeckhauser eds., 1984) cited in Orts, Complexity, op cit n, 87 p. 1602.
89 Orts op cit, n. 87.  This is a summary of Orts extensive arguments on pp.  1587-1612.
90
 Ibid, p. 1612
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business management studies.92  It is most certainly a right of all members of a society to 
participate in such a debate regardless of their material resources.  First they have this
right at least to the extent that they live in a democracy.  Democracy is based in part on 
the view of individual worth and self-expression.  Second, humans rarely occupy material 
resources for more than eighty years.  After that time material resources are passed on, 
dispersed, lost, disposed of or simply disintegrate.  By way of contrast, the social decision 
we make as a society has wide ranging, long-lasting and significant consequences, not 
only in our lifetimes but may affect the very future of life on the planet.   Finally, the 
nature of the discussion must address the public property versus private property debate.  
At what point, if any, should control of vast amounts of resources and vast groups of 
people be regulated by the public?93  Where such political decisions are being made, 
those decisions should be put on the table and openly discussed from these political 
decisions, appropriate models are developed, and indeed models are generally 
expressions of political decisions.94
6 MODELS 95
91 S. Bainbridge explicitly acknowledges his debate with communitarian corporate legal scholars is 
political.  Op cit n 4, p. 857.
92
 See for example, business scholar, Michael Jensen.  Although Jensen has been vocal in his political 
leanings in earlier works such as “Between Freedom and Democracy,” (1977) The Banker 39, where he 
uncritically advocates certain views as apolitical  truth, he seems to have dropped any mention of his views 
and presents his later work, although still informed by the same political views as objective management 
science.  “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function.” (2001) 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance.
93
 The issue of public and private is addressed considerably in the literature under the rubric 
of stakeholder modeling.  See also Cox op cit n. 4, G. Mark, “The Personification of the 
Business Corporation in American Law.”  (1987) 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1441 and J. Gordley, 
“The Moral Foundations of Private Law” (2002) 47 Am. J. Juris. 1
94 This is certainly the case in politics even more than in science.  See P. Feyerabend’s work on modelling 
and theory in his work on the philosophy of science.
95
 I have chosen to analyze this debate from the perspective of the Philosophy of Science.  It has been 
considered in an insightful article by Thomas Joo from the perspective of Cognitive Science and Literary 
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Models have an important part to play in understanding,96 whether attempting to 
understand oneself,97 one’s community,98 or the universe itself.99  Generally, models are 
miniature or simplified representations of structures, systems or processes.100 They 
provide insight about how things may work, and provide a platform from which it is 
possible to gain deeper insights and make better predictions, projections and suggestions 
about how things may work in the future, including very importantly, how modifications 
to structures, systems or processes may effect their future working.101 The first, 
informative function of models is sometimes described as “descriptive modelling.”102  It 
is particularly useful in natural sciences where such models help explain natural 
phenomena and permit us to understand causal connections between such phenomena.  In 
the social sciences, this is the more conservative approach to the scientific endeavour.103
Heuristics in “Corporations Theory and Corporate Governance Law: Contract, Property, and the Role of 
Metaphor in Corporations Law” (2002) 35 UC Davis L. Rev. 779.  Joo suggests that the corporation as a 
nexus of contracts—i.e. the Firm metaphor—is of limited applicability and therefore limited validity in 
explicating the nature of the corporation.  His recommendation of improving the metaphor by considering 
the property aspects of the corporation deserves serious discussion.  An alternative view is taken by Paul 
Cox who writes “clashing political moralities are imperfectly modeled as a confrontation between 
‘communitarianism’ and the neoclassical economic analysis of the firm” in “The Public, The Private and 
The Corporation” (1997) 80 Marq. L. Rev. 391, at p. 396.
96
 As a curious note, models are not likely exclusive to humans.  Psychologist Edward Chace Tolman 
studying rat abilities in navigating labyrinths, suggested that they create a “cognitive map” or model in 
order to navigate successfully.  “Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men” (1948) 55 Psych. Rev. 189-208
97 Models in psychology
98
 Models in social sciences
99 Models in physical sciences
100 See section “Model history is culture history” in Dr. Mueller “The Concept of Model and the Quadruple 
History of ‘Modulu’”, opening lecture of the 13th International Conference on History and the Philosophy 
of Science, Univ. of Zurich, 19-22 Oct., 2000 on Scientific Models: Their Historical and Philosophical 
Relevance.
101
 See for an extended discussion, M. Morgan and M. Morrison eds. Models as Mediators: Perspectives on 
Natural an Social Science (1999).
102 See Braybrooke, chapter “Causal Regularities on the Naturalistic Side” in Philosophy of Social Science, 
(1986), pp. 20-46.
103
 See D. Braybrooke’s chapters “Three Sides of Social Science” “Settled Social Rules on the Interpretive 
Side” in, pp. 1-19 and 47-67 respectively.
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The second predictive function is denominated “prescriptive” modelling.104  This type of 
modelling does not provide the strong causal connection found in the physical sciences.  
Rather, it provides mere probability in terms of correlational relevance.105  Nevertheless, 
it can provide valuable insight and guidance in terms of forward research and broader 
guidance.
Modelling, however useful as a heuristic device, like all human endeavour is value laden, 
or as discussed by such philosophers of science, as Lacan, “theory-laden.”  This 
phenomenon—sometimes referred to as the hermeneutical circle106—refers to the 
phenomena that one’s understanding is built upon previous understandings, each one 
supposedly advancing upon the previous understanding, but obviously, to some extent at 
least guided by the presuppositions, and limitations of the underlying theory.107
Model theory is important because of the restrictions and perspectives that models 
impose.108  Consider the restrictions models have imposed historically.  When one uses a 
spiritual model of human beings, illness is the result of demon possession or punishment 
for moral or spiritual failing. When one uses a biological models that same illness 
becomes a matter of bacterial infection, or chemical imbalance or other disease.  A less 
104 See Braybrooke on Social Science Interpretive methods.
105 Advances in correlational sciences have been greatly advanced by progress in statistical theory and 
calculation.  See for example, W. Salmon, Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance, (1970).
106
 See for example, the post-Heideggerian hermeneutics tradition as carried on by H. Gadamer, J. 
Weinsheimer, and D. Marshall Truth and Method, or furthered in post-Marxian critical thought as 
represented in Jurgen Habermas’ work such as Theory of Communicative Action
107
 Essentially, Feyerabend’s critique of scientific method.  See Against Method (1976).
108
 Although model theory was central to the debates of the philosophy of science from L. Wittgenstein 
Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921), R. Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax (1935) the term was 
coined by A. Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Meta-mathematics, (1954/55) and has subsequently formed the 
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dramatic change of models within a single discipline can have a dramatic outcome.  For 
example, modelling had a dramatic impact on a formerly fatal illness known as “childbed 
fever.”
Women in the nineteenth century who gave birth often died from the associated illness, 
“childbed fever.”  The Hungarian obstetrician and researcher, Ignaz Semmelweis, 
observed that women in the Maternity Hospital in Vienna where he worked had a higher 
mortality rate from “childbed fever”109 than other women in neighbouring clinics, or at 
home.  The model in vogue at the hospital and in the medical community at large 
suggested that the fever was the result of stale air.  As a result of this model, a concerted 
effort was made by the players to avoid exposing new mothers to stale air and air from 
the outdoors opened to the women.
Semmelweis began to look at other explanations, however, particularly after a colleague 
pathologist Kolletschka, cut himself in the process of an autopsy of a woman who had 
died of the illness.  The colleague soon succumbed to the same symptoms and was 
diagnosed as having died from childbed fever.  Semmelweis, the alert researcher, 
discarded the stale air model, made the connection between the cut and the illness, which 
in addition to radically decreasing the deaths from childbed fever, led to the discovery of 
germs. Had Semmelweis been so committed to his model that contradictory information 
basis for much subsequent advance in the study and understanding of scientific method.  Cited in Mueller 
op cit n. 100.
109 See the first hand account in I. Semmelweis, The Etiology, Concept and Prophylaxis of Childbed Fever, 
trans. K. Codell Carter in Medicine: A Treasury of Art and Literature 136, A. Carmichael and R. Ratzan ed. 
(1991).
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could not interfere, germs would not have been discovered possibly for several 
decades.110
As this example illustrates, the theory laden nature of model adopted can have significant 
impact on what is found.  In particular, how scientists deal with phenomena inconsistent 
with the model can be determinative of not only current findings, but also future progress 
and the allocation of resources to research programs111 or traditions.112
The problem resulting from model failure is dealt with in science in three manners or 
strategies.  Where phenomena are observed that cannot be explained by the model, they 
can be ignored, used to modify the model, or where the phenomena is too far from the 
model’s descriptive or predictive ability, the model can be discarded and a new model 
developed.113  When a model is beginning to fail the entrenched defenders of the model, 
who continue to control the power and resources of the discipline defend their model at 
times viciously against the researchers finding contradicting phenomena which 
undermines the model and make efforts to stifle the dissenting researchers’ voices.114  An 
interesting example of this is in the case of economist, Tibor Scitovsky, who was 
interested in examining and weighing families of preferences.  His efforts to do so were 
110 Kuhn in his discussion of “normal science” contra Popper’s suggestion that when falsified, a hypothesis 
can survive if the secondary premises of the hypothesis is discarded and the principle premise kept.  See 




 Laudan, Progress and its Problems (1977), and L. Laudan, “A Problem-Solving Approach to Scientific 
Progress”, in I. Hacking (ed.), Scientific Revolutions (1987).
113
 T. Kuhn’s seminal work challenging traditional notions of the rational progress of science by model 
advancement, sets out a theory based on an analysis of the actual development by a review of historical 
scientific discoveries.  Kuhn suggests a five phase development of science: 1) immature science, 2) normal 
science, 3) crisis, 4) revolution and 5) resolution.  In T. Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (1972)
114
 Kuhn, ibid.
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challenged, research resources were denied and other efforts were made to thwart him.115
Philosophers of science suggest that in fact this is the normal course of scientific research 
in which advocates of the current model control the resources, including research 
funding, faculty positions, and journals.116  The critical problem arising from this effort to 
stifle opposing views, as identified by Feyerabend, is that we cannot know what the 
future will discover and count or value as knowledge, and accordingly, following a 
dominant model too strictly may retard the advancement of knowledge more than aid 
it.117  All knowledge is founded upon cultural assumptions, and these assumptions are 
value laden.118  Feyerabend confronted this in a first hand profound manner while 
teaching at UC Berkley.  He wrote of his experience:
My function was to carry out the educational policies of the State of California 
which means I had to teach people what a small group of white intellectuals had 
decided was knowledge… In the years 1964ff. Mexicans, Blacks, Indians entered 
the university as a result of new educational policies. There they sat, partly 
curious, partly disdainful, partly simply confused hoping to get an ‘education’. 
What an opportunity for a prophet in search of a following! What an opportunity, 
my rationalist friends told me, to contribute to the spreading of reason and the 
improvement of mankind! I felt very differently. For it dawned on me that the 
intricate arguments and the wonderful stories I had so far told to my more or less 
sophisticated audience might just be dreams, reflections of the conceit of a small 
group who had succeeded in enslaving everyone else with their ideas. Who was I 
to tell these people what and how to think.119
Feyerabend’s insight is stunning, particularly in its blunt, critical and open presentation.  
It is a realization that in some ways became a clarion call for much of the academy 
115
 The Joyless Economy: An inquiry into human satisfaction and consumer dissatisfaction, (1976). 
116
 See for example, L. Laudan op cit n. 112,  I. Lakatos,  “Falsification and the methodology of Scientific 
Research Programs” in  I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, 
(1970), pp. 91-196, discussed in the social science by Pierre Bourdieu, “The Specificity of the Scientific 
Field and the Social Conditions of the Progrs of Reason,” (1975) Social Sicnece Information 19-47, 
discussed in D. Braybrooke, Philosophy of Social Science, (1985) pp. 77-78.
117
 See for example, P. Feyerabend, Against Method, (1975).
118
 This is Lakatos idea in his discussion of Theory-laden models.
119 Science in a Free Society (1978).
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afterwards as in many disciplines it drifted from stark rationalism into the post-moderism 
Feyerabend confronted in this period.
Many economists, like many other scientists, understanding of the role of modelling in 
science is at best weak.120  In economics, for example, the extreme views embraced by 
Positivists Friedman and Posner demonstrate an incorrect understanding of the nature of 
modelling despite its centrality to scientific enquiry.  
The Positivist Posner, for example, states “A model can be a useful tool of discovery 
even if it is unrealistic… even though its basic premise was false… We should be 
pragmatic about theory.”121 Another positivist Friedman writes:  “Important and 
significant hypotheses will be found to have 'assumptions' that are wildly inaccurate 
descriptive representations of reality ....”122  One cannot help but be find it a bit 
discomfiting to have major policy issues determined on bases we know to be “wildly 
inaccurate.”
The Normative Coase, on the other hand, states, “faced with a choice between a theory 
which predicts well but gives us little insight into how the system works and one which 
120
 See for example, Richard Rorty’s discussion of Nobel Laureate in Physics, Steven Weinberg, in his 
“Thomas Kuhn, Rocks and the Laws of Physics” (1997) 6 Common Knowledge 1, reprinted in R. Rorty, 
Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 175.
121
 R. Posner, “The New Institutional Economics meets law and economics,” (1993), 149 Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, p. 77.
122
 M. Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in Essays in Positive Economics 23 (1985) p. 
30.
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gives us this insight but predicts badly, I would choose the latter.”123  He continues, “…a 
theory is not like an airline or bus timetable.  We are not interested in simply the accuracy 
of its predictions. A theory also serves as a base for thinking.  It helps us to understand 
what is going on.”124  Posner is fundamentally, methodologically wrong.  Scientific 
theory is not about pragmatism.125 It is about understanding reality,126 about getting it 
right.127
While the internecine battling between academics may, with reason, seem trivial to those 
outside the academy, the implications of modelling do not stop on the steps of the 
academy.  Where those competing models have an impact on policy and as a result, on 
society and on occasion, even on the planet as a whole, modelling and the scientific 
process takes on a gravity that extends well beyond the academy, even to the most remote 
corners of the globe.128  Where, for example, a country adopts a particular economics
model, which as noted previously carries its value assumption of “economy above all”, 
increased global warming inducing carbon-dioxide emissions which benefit the economy 
123





 Posner’s inability to put together a credible theory of pragmatism or ethics is skillfully demonstrated by 
R. Dworkin in the latter’s review of Posner’s works The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory  (2000) 
and An Affair of State: The Investigation, Impeachment, and Trial of President Clinton (2000).  Dworkin’s 
critique can be found “Philosophy & Monica Lewinsky” 9 March, 2000  47 (4) New York Review of 
Books.
126
 This is not an adoption of essentialism.  Rather, by reality I mean the generally accepted phenomena 
under study by a group of scientists.
127
 Interestingly, jurist F. Hallis adopted a similar view of models in “juridical science.” Hallis offered:  
"[I]f therefore juristic concepts are not true universals, they are not pure fictions which have not relation to 
the true account of the real facts. . . .  [I]t is a sufficient answer to those who say that juristic science is not 
concerned with the real nature of social facts, but only with what the lawyer makes of them, to point out 
that the law has a practical and not a utopian aim."   Frederick Hallis, Corporate Personality xvi, xli (1930).  
xxxiii, cited in Mark, op cit, n. 93, p. 1470
128 Global warming’s effects are being seen, for example, in the isolated communities of the Canadian 
Artic. Mush at the North Pole in the NY Times T. Friedman in Alaska.
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are considered the better choice.129  Such is the economic modelling debate,130 of which
corporate modelling is a very important expression.  
Wisdom in handling models would like with Wittgenstein’s observation: “Say what you 
choose, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing the facts (And when you have seen 
them, there is a good deal you will not say.)”
As we have seen, there are various value or “theory-laden” aspects to the model 
discussion and these apply no less in law.  A fundamental analysis of scholar’s prior 
philosophical and political commitments has been conducted by Professor Cox.131  As 
Cox puts it: 
Resolution of conflicting normative visions through law conceived as a political 
process or dialogue, or as the practical wisdom of legal authority is not a 
resolution compelled by the norms of our community. Rather, it is a choice of one 
tradition over another. That choice is not itself justified by reference to the 
tradition chosen; it is merely explained by reference to the chooser's prior 
commitment to that tradition.132
These prior commitments address the role of the state, the nature of the individual and the 
nature of society.133  Briefly, the issues political and philosophical issues identified by 
Cox are threefold: (1) is the state an inefficient Levithan of whom we should be skeptical, 
129
 G.W. Bush stated USA environmental policy in just these terms.  In explaining why he rejected Kyoto 
he stated: “I will not accept anything that will harm our economy or hurt our American workers.” “Bush 
says Kyoto could harm American economy” March 29, 2001 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
While it may be argued that climate change may hurt the economy more than polluting will benefit it, 
because of the economic model used by the Bush Administration, the economic harm is apparently not 
factored in.
130
 In his famous lections on the Industrial Revolution, renowned historian A. Toynbee discussed the 
economic modelling debate as “Economic Science, and its antithesis, Socialism”, Lectures on the Industrial 
Revolution in England, (1884) reprinted as The Industrial Revolution, (1956) p. 58, cited in J. Cohen, 
Revolution in Science, (1985), p. 267.
131
 Cox, op cit, n 4.
132
 Cox, op cit, n. 4, p. 513.
Importance of Corporate Models 
Final  Ed.
32
or is its role to create and mold a better more humane, more just society?  (2) Is the 
individual a rational self-interest maximizer, or a social being, such as a social 
constructionists suggest,134 bound by the norms of society?  And finally, (3) is society a 
cooperative measure for the good of all, or is it a mere means for individual to achieve 
individual ends and society having no independent existence in and of itself?  The debate 
so framed becomes one in which the corporation and corporate law become one very 
important player in the larger enterprise of the understanding and shaping of human 
society and individuals.  The debate requires fundamental value judgments concerning, 
among other things, the valuing of solidarity135 over efficiency136 or vice-versa, such 
things as whose planet the Earth is, and whose interests count, and whose interests will be 
ignored.
As previously noted, models are of two types: descriptive and prescriptive.  The debate 
about models in corporate law has been restricted to the former: it has been a debate 
about what model best fits the corporation as we have it today in society.  From this 
perspective, the contractarians would appear to be correct in their views.137  As 
Bainbridge opines: 
“A theory is properly judged by its predictive power with respect to the 
phenomena it purports to explain,  not by whether it is a valid description of an 
objective reality.  As such, [quoting Friedman] "the relevant question to ask about 
the 'assumptions' of a theory is not whether they are descriptively 'realistic,' for 
133
 The framing of the issues as set in this paragraph is based on Cox’s article, op cit n 4, but in no way does 
justice to the careful and very sophisticated analysis offered by Professor Cox.
134
 See Cox n. 4
135
 Communitarian or Progressive Corporate law scholars.
136
 Contractarian Corporate law scholars.
137
 S. Bainbridge’s article is perhaps the best analysis of this aspect of the contractarian-communitarian 
debate.
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they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good approximations for the 
purpose in hand."138
Furthermore, as previously discussed, given the complexity of the issues, political 
inclinations and commitments, entrenched positions and interests, the debate on its own  
is unsatisfying and ultimately, an irresolvable debate.  The other type of model, the 
prescriptive, has some interest and importance in the discussions about law, economics, 
society and social policy.  Prescriptive models often do become descriptive models as 
society takes note of and adapts to or models itself after the prescriptive model.139  In this 
context, the questions of “What is the corporation?” is transformed into, and “What 
should the corporation become?” come into renewed focus.  And it is at this point that the 
discussion becomes very interesting and the difference between law and economics 
comes into even sharper contrast.
7 TRENDS AND CRITIQUES: STAKEHOLDERS, SHAREHOLDERS, AND 
VALUES
In North America up until the 1970’s, the model for the corporation had some social 
responsibility aspects.  As politics moved in a more conservative direction, however, the 
corporate legislation followed.140  The prescriptive model for the corporation following 
138
 Bainbridge, p. 871.
139
 Heuristic and hermeneutical aspects of the model have been discussed above.
140 L. McQuaig, All You Can Eat, Toronto: Penguin, 2001, pp. 33-39.
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the neo-classical141 economists’ advice was adjusted to a more profit directed orientation. 
This prescription has been to increase corporate focus on wealth generation even to the 
exclusion of all other concerns.  This view has been most directly advocated by one of 
the previously mentioned founders of the Chicago School, Milton Friedman.  In his 
famous dictum quoted previously the role of corporate managers is “to make as much 
money for their stockholders as possible”142  and that to propose social responsibility for 
corporation would “thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society.”143
Friedman and other profit maximization theorists,144 however, recognize that wealth is 
not an end in itself.  Rather, it is an intermediate end.145 Accordingly, these economists 
make social welfare the ultimate justification for the exclusive focus of corporations on 
profit.  In other words, the good end—social benefit—will be achieved by ignoring it and 
in fact focusing exclusively on another end—shareholder wealth maximization.146
In the law and economics field, Posner, Epstein and others have advocated wealth 
maximization as the organizing principal for law and have encouraged legislative and 
judicial reforms to implement this principal. Following Friedman, the shareholder 
primacy model as expressed by contractarians has become the dominant model of the 
141 I use the term “neo-classical” to denote economic theory that favours rational choice theory, free 
markets, and monetary control of the economy.  Economists who hold those values tend to be neo-liberal in 
political leanings, and so are at times referred to as neo-liberal economists.
142
 “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits,” Sept. 13, 1970, New York Times 




 See for example, Jensen, p. 302 “value maximization is an important one because it leads… to the 
maximisation of social welfare.”
145
 Acknowledged even by Posner, The Economics of Justice, (1981) p. 108and discussed in more detail in 
Cunningham, op cit, n. 58, p. 164.
146
 This position shows either a remarkable quasi-religious faith in free market economics or a Zen 
approach to social justice.  For a discussion of foundations of the stakeholder-shareholder debate see my 
“Scrooge, the Reluctant Shareholder: Theoretical Problems in the Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate” 
(Forthcoming) 12 U. Miami Bus. L.R.
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corporation in corporate law.  If economics is indeed a science, as it claims to be, then it 
must be acknowledged that an unshakable faith in a model is a religious position rather 
than a scientific one.147  Science and the scientist must deal with their models in light of 
the evidence rather than the reverse: dealing with the evidence in light of the model.148  It 
should be asked, therefore, whether in fact the evidence demonstrates that following the 
neo-liberal, shareholder primacy model has increased social wealth. 
The evidence is in and this model, particularly as applied in corporate law as the 
shareholder primacy/contractarian model, does not make for a better society.149  It can 
hardly be argued that positive economics at least in its neo-liberal form have been 
successful in creating a wealthier or more just society.    
The proposition that increasing shareholder wealth benefits all of society seems highly 
suspect in economic studies.  For example, in the USA, as corporations have lost broader 
societal focus and increased shareholder primacy, one finds a growing disparity between 
rich and poor and decline in the wealth of the middle class.150  The figures indicate a 
147
 John Kenneth Galbraith views the changes in his opinion in this light.  Stephen P. Dunn, “The Origins of 
the Galbraithian System: J.K. Galbraith” interview with J.K. Galbraith, 2001.10 Division of Economics at 
Staffordshire University Business School. www.staffs.ac.uk/schools/business/ economics/papers/ec2001-
10.pdf
148
 This is indeed Coase’s point in the discussion above.
149
  See for example, the summary of statistics of poverty and homelessness in the United States in  
“Change The Channel” by Bob Herbert, December 19, 2003 NY Times. 
150
 See for example, David Cay Johnston who reports “The 400 wealthiest taxpayers accounted for more 
than 1 percent of all the income in the United States in the year 2000, more than double their share just 
eight years earlier,” in “Very Richest's Share of Income Grew Even Bigger, Data Show” New York Times 
article, June 26, 2003.  Clearly, there are many reasons for such disparities such as government policies, 
performance of the economy and changes in the labour force resulting from globalization, but the disparity 
noted parallels the shift away from stakeholder thinking and seems to suggest that shareholder primacy 
cannot be supported along these lines.  See Millon, Frontiers, p.229-230 on the triumph of shareholder 
primacy in this era. And L. McQuaig, op ict n. 140, pp. 96-107.
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growing disparity between rich and poor and a monopolization of power associated with 
riches.  Indeed, World Bank and IMF economists151 whose structural adjustment 
programs, an integral part of which have been to open borders to transnational 
shareholder primacy corporations, have been a failure born on the backs of the poor.152
The question, of course, is who is responsible for the distribution of goods in society in 
the first place.  It cannot be assumed that a consensus exists concerning the equitable 
distribution of goods.  Some will argue that the distribution of resources is irrelevant to 
the organization of society.  Others will argue that a just society requires consideration 
and some adjustment of the distribution of society’s benefits.153  Yet others, following 
Coase’s work, argue that absent transaction costs, the initial allocation of social benefits 
is immaterial.  Parties will allocate goods to their most efficient use if permitted the 
opportunity to do so.  If, however, we accept that society is for mutual benefit, and that 
neo-classical economics advocates the contractarian, shareholder primacy model for its 
stated purpose of improving social wealth, then we have the appropriate criteria to make 
a judgment.  That judgment would appear to be, in summary, say that the overall benefits 
151 W. Easterly, “The effect of IMF and World Bank programs on poverty” (2000) available on IMF 
website http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2000/00-00/e.pdf   See also Noble Prize Laureate and 
former chief economist at the World Bank Joseph Stiglitz’ book, Globalization and Its Discontents, (2001) 
and more recently, “The Broken Promise of NAFTA” January 6, 2004 NY Times.  C. Welch, Structural 
Adjustment Programs & Poverty Reduction Strategy, (April 2000) Vol 5, Foreign Policy in Focus, Number 
14. See also McQuaig’s discussion op cit n. 140, pp. 82-92
152
 N. Lustig, economist and former Director of the World Bank’s World Development Report and non-
resident Senior Fellow at Brookings Institute observes that the poor and middle class absorb an inordinate 
share of the pain of structural adjustments.  See her chapter “Social Costs” in N. Lustig, Mexico: The 
Remaking of an Economy, (1992) pp. 61-95. See Dine, Governance, Chap. 5 and extensive notes therein. 
For a recent analysis see Egor Kraev (2003 ). Modeling Macroeconomic and Distributional Impacts of 
Stabilization and Adjustment Packages: Current Literature and Challenges.. CEPA Working Paper 2003-
06 available at 
http://www.newschool.edu/cepa/papers/abstract.htm#200306
153
 Coase of course recognized that the real world operates with transaction costs and so that his theorem 
was merely an analytical tool for wealth maximization. 
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supposed to come from this neo-liberal economic model and its prescriptive corporate 
law model of shareholder primacy have simply not appeared. 
Accordingly, for legal scholars to adhere to this model—the contractarian corporation—
is an abdication of professional responsibility. Lawyers and legal scholars must be 
concerned with issues of ethics and justice. It is not sufficient to take Chancellor William 
Allen’s previously mentioned observation that the contractarian model of the corporation 
is “the dominant legal academic view” and end the discussion.  Describing what is cannot 
be the same as saying what should be.
The argument for shareholder primacy is essentially an ethical argument from 
utilitarianism.154  Quite simply, by focusing on the shareholder one produces the greatest 
efficiency one maximizes social wealth and hence overall social utility.  Interestingly, 
Friedman himself recognizes that neither wealth nor efficiency are ultimate values for 
society.  He wrote: “I would favor a free society even if it were less productive than some 
alternative—say a slave society… because my basic value is freedom itself.”155
Accordingly, it is appropriate even from an economist’s perspective to inquire about 
values and which values we wish to pursue in society.  These economists are correct as 
far as they go—that society is for improved material benefit.156  Social contractarians 
have made this argument in various forms for centuries.157  Economists, however, fail to 
154
 See Posner’s acknowledgement of his “wealth maximization” theory as a refinement of ethical 
utilitarianism, op cit n 8.
155
 M. Friedman, n. 49.
156 Rawls argues this as his first principle of social organization.  Conflicting views are presented in Jared 
Diamond, Germs, Guns and Steel: The Fate of Human Society (1996) Norton.
157 Philosophers with highly diverging views have made the Social Contract argument from John Locke and 
Jean Jacques Rousseau, to the present day John Rawls.
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go far enough.  As Rawls pointed out nearly thirty years ago, the second pillar of the 
social contract is justice in economy.158  Economics is not a “value free” science.159
Economics, as some economists readily acknowledge,160 does not hold all the answers 
and legal scholars should not be seduced into following that lead too quickly or 
unquestioningly.161  As Orts in his compelling analysis of normative corporate law 
observes, “Corporate law, like most law, is primarily about the rule-oriented structuring 
of social power, and it is specifically about the rules that structure the organization of 
economic power.”162   Following Rawls, therefore, a compelling argument can be made 
that corporate law should include access to power by non-shareholders.163
As a start, therefore, legal scholars should be developing a model that enhances access to 
economic power for more parties.  Friedman’s and other neo-liberal economists’ dislike 
158
 Rawls, p. 4 and discussed in detail, 60-75, and 90-95.
159 Indeed, there is no such thing as “value free” science, even in the hard sciences and we should not let 
ourselves be fooled into thinking economics is any such thing, especially as a social science.  For the basic 
philosophical discussion undermining science as a rational progressive enterprise, see T. Kuhn, The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions 2nd ed. (1970).  As an attack on positivist epistemology, the work of C. 
Levi-Strauss probably serves as a good starting point.  B. Hsiung points out that economic method is a two 
step method that requires value decisions, and offers a range of values which could be adopted by 
economists.  In Hsiung, Success, op cit, n. 12, p. 7-10.  Heilbroner attacks the scientific model as 
appropriate for the study of economics in “Visions and Analysis in the History of Economic Thought” in P. 
Porta et al Knowledge, Social Institutions and the Division of Labour (2001) Northampton, USA at pp. 59-
63.  As applied in corporate law, see T. Joo, “Corporations Theory and Corporate Governance Law: 
Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporate Law,” (2002) 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev 779 who 
observes, “rules of corporate law are often based on social welfare judgments of judges, lawmakers, and 
regulators rather than on parties’ bargains in the marketplace.  It misleadingly suggests that the law imposes 
no value judgments but merely rubber stamps freely made individual decisions.  Thus, the model lulls us 
into thinking we can avoid the hard questions of how the law makes its value judgments.” P. 778. 
160
 Discussed in Hsuing, Method, p. 187, n. 2.
161
 Some economists plainly admit the fundamental role of values in their studies.  See for example, Lipsey 
and Chrystal, An Introduction to Positive Economics, 8th ed., Oxford, p. 28, cited in J. Wolfenden, “Homo 
economicusI: Fantastics fact or factual fantasy?”  (1998) 1(2) Ethos—A Journal of Global Ethics. 
162
 P. 1577.
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of intrusions on freedom164 cannot be restricted to preserving freedom for those wealthy 
and powerful enough to afford it.  Hardly anyone would be willing to see a return to the 
pre-suffragette or pre-emancipation USA.165  Yet the current model is just that—a 
regressive concentration of power and wealth in the hands of the few under guise of 
freedom.  As we have seen, it sets the grounds for an increasing amount of wealth and 
power in fewer hands—it can hardly be any wonder that wealthy contractarians no longer 
engage in the debate about corporate models, justice and wealth distribution.166  As 
scholar Stephen Bainbridge observes:  “As a matter of intellectual interest, the debate 
over the contractual nature of the firm is over…. Those who adhere to the nexus of 
contracts model pass those who do not like so many ships in the night.”167
Just as the economists at the World Bank are asking themselves,168 what then is the 
alternative model for development loans and government restructuring,169 legal scholars 
need to be examining more carefully alternative models for corporations that both 
enhance social justice and economic growth.170  Legal scholars should be asking 
important questions such as what objective should a new prescriptive model include?  
163
 See suggestion by W. Wilson Leung “The Inadequacy Of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed Corporate 
Regime That Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests” Columbia J. Law and Social Problems (Summer 
1997) Vol. 30 (4), p. 587.
164
 See for example the alarmist, libertarian appeal made by Michael Jensen and William Meckling in 
“Between Freedom and Democracy”, (1977) The Banker, p. 39.
165
 M. Parenti “A Constitution for the Few” (1988).  In particular, see excerpt in T. Simon, Law & 
Philosophy, (2003) 172-177.  See also L. Cunningham’s discussion of the economics of slavery in 
Cunningham, op cit n. 58.
166
 Bainbridge, op cit, n. 4.  
167 Bainbridge op cit n. 33, p. 857.
168
 See Stiglitz, op cit n. 19.
169
 Possibly, new answers could arise if the science of economics is another point of revolution.  Cohen, 
citing John Hicks notes various revolutions in the science of economics, including a current movement 
away from Keynesian economics.  Cohen, op cit., n. 131, p. 558-559.  From J. Hicks, “‘Revolutions’ in 
economics” (1976) in Spiro Latsis, ed. Method and Appraisal in Economics, 207.
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And then, of course, look at developing new models that would more effectively include 
those objectives.  
Other models that have done somewhat better in terms of achieving better social ends171
are those found in Europe and in particular Germany, and in Japan.  The models followed 
in those countries have included other interests such as labour and collaborating 
companies.  While the economists correctly argue that Japan’s model has not made the 
most efficient use of economic resources,172 as we have seen, efficiency is not the 
measure of all things.  Indeed, Japan has been much more successful than America in 
keeping the ravages of a severe economic downturn from destroying people and 
communities.  Unlike America which acquiesced to creating the hobos and communities 
hobbled by broken families caused by unemployment as America did in the Great 
Depression,173 Japan, whose decade long downturn has been even more severe than the 
Great Depression in the USA, has neither of these phenomena in any significant number.  
Indeed, in Japan nearly all the economic fluctuations have been borne by shareholders 
who have invested excess funds174 as opposed to employees whose life’s work and very 
170
 These are not necessarily conflicting norms.  See for example, J. Hogendorn, Economic Development, 
3rd ed. (1996).
171
 As distasteful as it may be to some market economists, it must be recognized that China’s communist 
centrally controlled economy has been credited with saving millions from starvation which would 
otherwise have arisen under capitalist market conditions.  See The Economist…. 
172
 The argument is made that the market for corporate control is stifled by the cooperation of companies 
with each other reducing efficiency by keeping afloat companies that should be in bankruptcy.  See for 
example, Economist March 2002 in which the banking argument is made.
173
 The American experience of the time was immortalized by John Steinbeck in The Grapes of Wrath—an 
excellent reminder of the situation for the average family in that time.  It is hard to imagine anyone reading 
that work and puzzling whether families in poverty are more concerned about efficiency in the market for 
corporate control and greater overall wealth, and the need for a basic income.
174
 Or savings.  I use the term “excess funds” to emphasize that these funds are not needed for day to day 
living, and hence, “excess.”
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livelihood are dependent on employment.175  Japan’s legendary low unemployment 
figures are a reflection in part of this model.176
8 CORPORATE MODELS FOR THE FUTURE
Regardless of one’s political and philosophical commitments it is evident that 
corporations with the concentrations of wealth and resources and as the major source of 
employment are the major drivers of the economy, culture and environment.  
Accordingly, the importance of decisions about corporate models can hardly be 
overstated.  Not only will they have considerable bearing on the overall economy but also 
on development of societies throughout the world and such incredibly important things 
such as global warming.  Before considering what models should be considered for the 
future, a very modest review of contemporary models and their respective strengths and 
weakness may serve as a springboard for our thinking forward, which will be followed by 
a brief review of two management scholars’ views of future corporations and the 
significance of those ideas for future corporate law development.
a) ANGLO-AMERICAN MODEL
The distinctive aspect of Anglo-American model is its “shareholder primacy.”  
Shareholder primacy places the interests of the shareholder above all others, and as we 
175
 Columbia University economist Frank Lichtenberg "In a Downturn, Cut Profits Before Jobs" New York 
Times (Sunday Business Section), Feb. 16, 1992, Section 3, p. 13, cited in Murray Dobbin, The Myth of the 
Good Corporate Citizen, (1998), p. 74, n. 29.
176
 Recent unemployment figures for Japan are 5.2% “Japan PM: Economy emerging from slowdown,” 
Monday, January 5, 2004 · Associated Press, compared to United States’ current accurate figure of nearly 
9.2% “The White-Collar Blues” By Bob Herbert, December 29, 2003, Monday NY Times.
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have seen even to the exclusion of all other interests.177  Other interests which are ignored 
include such things as the social costs,178 environmental costs, and employee needs.  
Every cost the Anglo-American corporation can avoid, it does avoid in order to return 
more money to the shareholders.  Every benefit it can appropriate it does without regard 
to ensuring “there is enough, and as good left in common for others.”179
i) Benefits of the Anglo-American Model
This model is very attractive to for a number of reasons.  First, it is attractive because it is 
familiar.  Second, it is attractive because it puts a considerable amount of money into the 
hands of shareholders in a short amount of time.180 Thirdly, when the economy is 
growing well, the share values of these companies increase rapidly.181 Finally, its 
advocates claim that it is the most efficient. As noted, however, each model has not only 
strengths but also particular weaknesses.
ii) Weaknesses of the Anglo-American Model
One problem of the Anglo-American model is that it causes a short-term focus.  The 
corporation’s executive are more concerned about quarterly results and daily stock prices 
177
 M. Miller, “Is American Corporate Governance Fatally Flawed?” chapter in Donald Chew ed., Studies 
in International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems: A Comparison of the US., Japan, and Europe, 
(1997) Oxford p. 38. 
178
 Social costs include things as harm to consumers, and “social capital” discussed for example, in Paldam, 
“Social capital: One or many? Definition and measurement,” (14:5) Journal of Economic Surveys, , 629-
653 and in M. Fafchamps, B. Minten, “Returns to social network capital among traders” (2002) Oxford 
Economic Papers, 54, 173-206.
179
 John Locke, Second Treatise on Government, Ch. 5. para 26.  Locke’s theories form the underpinning of 
the neo-classical economists view of private property. 
180
 Steven Kaplan, “Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: A Comparison of Germany, Japan 
and the U.S.”, chapter in Donald Chew ed., Studies in International Corporate Finance and Governance 
Systems: A Comparison of the US., Japan, and Europe, (1997) Oxford p. 253.
181
 Kaplan’s numerous studies are summarized in this chapter and he finds little difference except in terms 
of use of cash pp. 251-257.
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than the long term viability of the corporation.  Not only may this short term executive 
focus be tied to corporate scandals,182 it also causes serious under-investment in capital 
expenditures that in turn undermine the long-term viability of the corporation.183  Such 
companies are vulnerable to becoming outmoded and to collapse, which in turn causes 
serious economic and social consequences.184  Most Anglo societies are able to deal with 
such collapses including corporate funded pension collapses, because their economies are 
sufficiently robust and they have adequate social security systems; however, given the 
demographic changes and changes in fiscal policy, the strength and durability of such 
programs is questionable.185
Another problem with the Anglo-American model becomes evident when there is an 
economic downturn.  As the world’s foremost management professor Peter Drucker 
observed: “It is a fair weather model that works well only in times of prosperity.”186  In 
an economic downturn, Anglo-American corporations lay-off promptly their employees 
and as a result, in a recession many people are out of work.187  This approach to 
182
 Krugman has referred to this as the lesson of the recent scandals, that we cannot bribe corporate officials 
to do their jobs. Paul Krugman has observed that options have been an important motivator in stock price 
manipulation.  “The Outrage Constraint,” August 23, 2002, NY Times. Paul Krugman opines, “now it's 
clear that options were a big motivator for corporate fraud,” in his Op-Ed piece, “Enron and the System” 
January 9, 2004 NY Times.
183
 Porter, M. E. "Capital Disadvantage: America's Falling Capital Investment System." Harvard Business 
Review (September-October 1992).. 
184
 The Enron cost, for example, was in excess of $35 billion. Brookings Institution.
185
 See changes to unemployment in Chicago’s demographic Bob Herbert “Locked Out at a Young Age” 
October 20, 2003 NY Times.  The extent to which this data can or should be extrapolated, is of course 
uncertain.  Nevertheless, there needs to be some attention to the issues raised there. 
186
 P. Drucker, “Will the corporation survive? Yes, but not as we know it.”  Sep 15, 2001. Vol. 360, Iss. 
8239; p. 16.
187
 At the time of writing, the American unemployment figures suggest that 480,000 lost jobs in the last 
month in response to the protracted economic downturn, and discussion concerning a severely “jobless 
recover” suggest this may be more than a mere temporary problem.
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economic downturns is not too damaging to the employees or to the economy, again 
because of the social security system.   
Anglo-American governments have strong social security systems to help employees 
without jobs continue to pay mortgages other living expenses and other costs.  This 
ability of laid-off employees to continue their basic consumption habits is critical to the 
Anglo-American economies because of their reliance on consumers.  The USA economy, 
for example, relies on consumers for two-thirds of its size and a great part of its activity.  
Another problem arises from the Anglo-American model’s ignoring other interests, or 
externalizing.  Interests such as environment, social problems and employees have a cost 
which cannot be avoided.  Although not taken into consideration by the Anglo-American 
model these costs must be paid in one way or another.188  The Anglo-American way of 
addressing these costs is through its very expensive.  The GDP contribution of legal 
services to the USA economy is significant.189
The costs of dealing with these externalized costs through the legal system are 
astronomical.  The American economy and American corporations struggle under the 
burden of legal costs190 to the extent that nearly every legal reform program looks at ways 
188
 Coase’s Social Costs op cit, n. 51, deals with those costs caught by law; where law has not yet 
recognized such harms, for all economic and legal purposes, they fail to exist.
189
 W. Stavropoulos, President of Dow Chemical Company, claimed that the costs of tort claim 2.2% of the 
GDP of the USA. This, of course, is not much of an argument if tort law works as it should: this is just the 
cost to the economy for corporate malfeasance through product liability.
190
 Search Google for article by jury consultants on Jury perspectives on corporate America.  See for 
example, “Interview with Valerie P. Hans, author of Business on Trial: The Civil Jury and Corporate 
Responsibility” (March/April 2002) 13:2 Bimonthly Review Of Law Books 
http://www.law.suffolk.edu/faculty/ebander/index10-12-00.html
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of making the system less costly.191  Not only is it very expensive, but it is questionable 
how efficient the system is in either paying externalized costs or preventing them in the 
first place.  Indeed, it could be argued that many Anglo-American corporations operate 
with a “deferred costs” approach where corporations and corporate executives create 
costs— social, environment and other costs—with the hope that they will not be 
discovered and enforced through the legal system until they have taken their profits and 
the shareholders have taken their profits.  Such cases include the examples of the asbestos 
lawsuits that bankrupted the Johns Mansville Corporation192 and the recently launched 
employee suits for exposure to toxic chemicals while working in IBM chip 
manufacturing facilities,193 as well as the actions behind the collapses of Enron, 
Worldcom and Tyco among too many others.
In addition, it is important to note that the Anglo-American exclusion of other 
“stakeholder” interests has led to considerable anti-corporate backlash which in part is 
behind the WTO and other anti-globalization protests.194  Anglo-American corporations 
191 S. Datta and J. Nugent have shown that for every increase of 1% in the number of lawyers in a society, 
economic growth suffers between about 4% cited in R. Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics: An 
Economic Theory of Property (1997), Addison-Wesley, p. 79. 
192
 To cite but a few of the 600,000 see Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1986) 
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 , Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 
1129 (5th Cir. 1985), Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1983), Prelick v. 
Johns-Manville Corp., 531 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Pa. 1982), Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. 
Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981).  On the mass number of the suits, see Richard L. Cupp, Jr “ASBESTOS 
LITIGATION & TORT LAW: TRENDS, ETHICS, & SOLUTIONS: Asbestos Litigation and Bankruptcy: 
A Case Study for Ad Hoc Public Policy Limitations on Joint and Several Liability” (2003) 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 
203.  Cupp observes that as many as 3,000,000 suits may be filed in the case, and according the right wing 
think tank, the RAND Corporation, supposedly the majority of people filing are not sick. This objection to 
such claims is odd for two reasons: first, how is one to know whether the litigants are or will be sick 
without the evidence, and second, tort claims may be for those who suffer loss of a family member as well 
as being made by injured parties themselves. 
193
 Bob Herbert, See also “Clouds in Silicone Valley” NY Times 03/09/08.
194
 Published by the Hemispheric Social Alliance.  FTAA Exposed: A Citizens’ Critique of the November 
2002 Draft of the Free Trade Area of the Americas.  
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are being forced by the Corporate Social Responsibility movement to expand their 
horizons and to spend money to include other concerns.  The societies living with this 
model see the corporation as a destructive force in society which must be subject to a 
high level of regulation and control.195
Unlike enterprises in most other parts of the world,196 Anglo-American model of the 
corporation has traditionally been a collection of unrelated strangers who invest money 
together.  It is run by a board of directors who represent only the interests of shareholders 
and management.  One of the on-going problems for participants in this model is the 
constant effort to keep parties working together.197  Each party focuses exclusively on 
and fights for self-interest above all else.  It is an antagonistic, expensive model to 
manage.  Indeed, much research has focused on minimizing the effects of the “agency 
problem”—the problem when investors and management are distant from each other and 
pursuing separate, different interests.198  Further, this animus is in part what drives the 
very expensive and questionably beneficial market for corporate control.199
195
 Regulation of Corporations is one important aspect of jury perspectives.  See  Donald E. Vinson And 
David Perlut, “The American Jury’s View of Corporate America: It’s Not A Pretty Picture,” (February 
2003) Briefly… Perspectives on Legislation, Regulation, and Litigation 7( 2), published by National Legal 
Center for the Public Interest.  From the opposite end of the political spectrum, see work by such authors as 
David Korten, When Corporations Rule the World. 2nd ed. (2000).
196
  “Who is in charge? The ins and outs of corporate governance,”  Oct. 25, 2003, The Economist, pp. 15-
16.
197
 This issue of agency costs which started with Berle and Means, has been carried forward in the workd of 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling, and O. Williamson.  W. C. Kester,  “Governance, Contracting, and 
Investment Horizons: A Look At Japan and Germany,” chapter in Donald Chew ed., Studies in 
International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems: A Comparison of the US., Japan, and Europe, 
(1997) Oxford, 227
198 Bainbridge notes that this issue is now passé for most law and economics scholars. See S. Bainbridge, 
The Politics of Corporate Governance, (1995) 18 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 671, 671-78 (reviewing Mark J. 
Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (1994).
199
 C.K. Prahalad, “Corporate Governance or Corporate Value added? Rethinking the Primacy of 
Shareholder Value” chapter in Donald Chew ed., Studies in International Corporate Finance and 
Governance Systems: A Comparison of the US., Japan, and Europe, (1997) Oxford p. 47-50.  See also M. 
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iii) Implications of the Anglo-American model for Societies
There are a number of particular and significant implications that can be drawn from the 
Anglo-American model poses. This model may not be well suited to economies that are 
not robust.  A large corporate collapse in a weaker economy can be expected to have 
significant percussion throughout the economy and have significant social costs.  
Furthermore, some societies, workers do not have the benefit of a social security system.  
As a result, when the average worker in such a society loses a job, it is a crisis.  
Furthermore, if there is an economic downturn and workers do not have income to 
continue to spend, such an economy will have greater difficulty reviving.  It simply will 
lack the consumption necessary to keep the economy prosperous.  Accordingly, the 
Anglo-American model which cuts jobs rapidly and drastically in an economic downturn 
is not well suited to many other economies, including possibly the United States of the 
future.200
In its essence, the shareholder primacy model reflects American values: neo-classical 
economics and neo-liberal values.201  There are important consequences which flow from 
this American value, including increased wealth concentration, higher levels of 
unemployment, and some of the problems with corporate governance are exaggerated.  
Given some of the problems of the Anglo-American model discussed, it is clear that there 
may be benefits to considering what other models may be available.
Mark Walker, “On the shareholder wealth maximization objective of corporate governance: The case of 
leveraged recapitalizations,” (1996) 22(4) Managerial Finance 53. 
200 M. Walsh “Failed Pensions: A Painful Lesson in Assumptions”  Nov 12, NYTimes




One of the European models which may offer some interesting alternatives is the German 
model.  The German corporation is structured with a two tiered or “dual model” Board of 
Directors.202 The executive board or “Vorstand” are management.  The supervisory 
board, “Aufsichtsrat” is a split board with one section of the board of directors made up 
of shareholder nominated directors, and the other section of the board, being made up of 
employee nominated directors.203  It is interesting to note that in contrast to the Anglo-
American model in which all directors are nominated by the shareholders and are 
professional managers, the directors nominated by German workers are there to represent 
them, and although usually professionally trained as economists or business scholars, 
they are not managers.204  This peculiar board structure is limited in its application to 
corporations which have more than two thousand employees—the 
“Mitbestimmungsgestz.”  Perhaps most interesting is that the operative executive board 
“Vorstand” is answerable not to the shareholders, but to the “Aufsichtsrat” or 
participatory supervisory board.
German corporations often invest money in training the worker nominated directors to 
help them become more effective in their roles as directors.  This management training 
helps worker nominated directors to understand the management problems faced by the
201 See Mark’s interesting intellectual history reaching from 13th century theology to the 20th century’s view 
of the business corporation in the USA. Mark, op cit, n. 93.
202
 G. Alexander, “Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Rights? The German Example,” (March 2003) 
88 Cornell L. Rev. 733
203
 F. Schilling, “Corporate Governance in Germany: the move to shareholder value,” (29001) 9(3) 
Corporate Governance, 148. 
204
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particular corporation.  By investing in this training, the German corporations are able to 
get the maximum benefit from the worker nominated directors, and the workers are more 
effective in communicating management concerns to workers and worker concerns to 
management.  These directors work to protect workers’ rights and interests.  
Finally, German corporations tend to be financed by banks—that is, banks tend to be the 
major shareholders and indeed have accounted for some 90% of all external corporate 
finance.205  This shareholding pattern will be seen to have significant effects in the 
management of economic downturns.
i) Benefits of the German Model  
Germany benefits from this model in two important strategic ways.  First, there is less 
labour unrest.  Unlike the Anglo-American model where parties are fighting against each 
other else in pursuit of their own self-interests, the German model functions better 
because it aligns management and worker interests in the larger, overall goal of 
advancing the corporation.  Indeed, although German executive see problems with the 
boards, they would not wish to change it.206
The second advantage is that it puts the workers in direct touch with the management 
solving at least in part, two fundamental management problems—communication and 
trust.207  Management can understand worker complaints, concerns and suggestions more 
directly and easily.  Workers sometimes have significant contributions to make to 
205
 J. Scott, Corporate Business and Capitalist Classes, (1997), p. 145-146.
206
 Schilling, op cit, p. 149.
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management of the corporation because of their very different perspective and hands-on 
experience with operations.
German corporations, given their ability to coordinate more interests have more parties 
interested in the corporation’s survival.  As a result, they tend to keep their investments in 
capital equipment up-to-date, and have more secure long term outlooks.208 German 
companies tend to have longer strategic visions, less collapses, and are still very 
appealing to investors.209
Traditionally, German corporations are family businesses.210  The structure discussed 
reflects these family values and it seems to work well for those families.  By including 
many more concerns German corporations have been highly successful not only in 
producing top quality products, but they have been able to do so competitively.  
ii) Drawbacks of the German  
Effective use of this model requires an egalitarian view of humanity.  Whether presidents 
of companies or workers on the factory floor, the view must be that humans are valuable, 
intelligent and willing contributors to overall group achievement.   Furthermore, 
management needs to have a confidence that workers have the intelligence and goodwill 
to contribute.  Finally, the model requires a level of sophistication among workers.
207
 Insert HR or OB reference ???
208
 Schilling, op cit, p. 150.
209
 Scott, op cit n. 205, p. 147-149, and Schilling, ibid.
210
 See “Who is in charge” article in the Economist, op cit n 196, and Scott, op cit, n. 205, p. 146-147.
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c) JAPANESE MODEL 
Another corporate model which should be of interest is the Japanese model.  Japanese 
corporate law and practice is an interesting mix of German, traditional Japanese, and 
American law.211  In some ways, Japanese corporate law has drawn the best of each of 
the systems.  It is important to note that although Japanese corporate law was established 
in 1950 by the occupying USA forces in practice it has developed differently.212 To 
create corporate law the USA basically translated and planted the Model Business 
Corporations Act into the Japanese legal system. Thus, although at a legal level Japan has 
essentially American corporate law, Japanese corporations have largely ignored the law 
and operated their corporations on the basis of extra-legal norms.213  Since it is these 
norms have driven corporate development in Japan more than the law, the relevant 
discussion focuses on the model set out by the norm rather than the law.
The Japanese model has rejected Anglo-American model “shareholder primacy.”  In fact, 
in the Japanese model, shareholders interests are among the least important of the 
interests to be considered.214   Japanese priorities are: the corporation itself, customers, 
employees, creditors and finally, shareholders.215
211
 M. West “The Puzzling Divergence Of Corporate Law: Evidence And Explanations 
From Japan And The United States”  (2001) 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 527 p. 538.
212 See discussion in West, ibid.  
213
 See discussion Curtis Milhaupt “Symposium Norms & Corporate Law: Creative Norm Destruction: The 
Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance,” (2001) 149 U. Ps. L. Rev. 2083.
214
 J. Farrar, Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand, (2001) Oxford, p. 34. 
215 See. Toshiba Chairman, Joichi Aoi, “To Whom Doe the company belong?: A new management mission 
for the information age,” chapter in Donald Chew ed., Studies in International Corporate Finance and 
Governance Systems: A Comparison of the US., Japan, and Europe, (1997) Oxford, 244 p. 247.
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The Japanese model is based on the village system where everyone worked together for 
common survival and the common good.216  Accordingly, as noted, Japanese executives 
have given a higher priority to employees’ interests than to shareholder interests.  One 
example of that priority is the Japanese corporate policy lifetime employment.217  While 
it is changing, it is interesting to note how the Japanese corporation has survived in very 
difficult economic times. This priority has created significant benefits for Japanese 
society.  
i) Benefits of the Japanese Model  
What is particularly interesting about the Japanese modeled corporation is how it has 
buffered society from economic crisis, addresses the interests excluded by the Anglo-
American model and still has had great success in attracting foreign investment.  It is 
particularly interesting because Japan has experienced one of the most severe economic 
declines in the history of the world with its society relatively in tact.  
Japan’s economy has been in recession, if not depression, for over ten years.218  The 
Japanese economy has shrunk more in the last ten years than the American economy did 
in the Great Depression of the 1930’s.219  Despite this economic decline, the average 
Japanese worker has been able to go on without experiencing the frightening, devastating 
216 K. Ohmae, The Mind of the Strategist, (1982) NY. McGraw-Hill, pp. 218-219.  Milhaupt claims the 
model is not the village but the family.  Op cit n. 5, p. 2090.
217
 Curtis Milhaupt “Symposium Norms & Corporate Law: Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of 
Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance,” (2001) 149 U. Ps. L. Rev. 2083
218
 “Finance And Economics: Checking the slumpometer; Economics focus,” The Economist. London:
Mar 2, 2002. Vol. 362; p. 91.
219
 “Finance And Economics: Checking the slumpometer; Economics focus,” The Economist. London:
Mar 2, 2002. Vol. 362; pg. 91 Contrary view is expressed by Paul Krugman whose observes that Japan’s
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loss of employment.  People still have jobs, there is no threat of rebellion, consumers can 
still buy and the economy continues to work because of its consumers even though it 
continues to suffer severe problems.220
By way of contrast, in the Great Depression of the 1930’s, American society suffered
greatly, its workers had no money to spend and vast multitudes were reduced to utter 
poverty.  Unlike the Anglo-American model which passed the costs of the economic 
decline directly onto the employees, the Japanese corporate model passes the costs of the
decline to the shareholders and institutional lenders.221
A further benefit may be its efficiency—opinion is quite varied on efficiency, depending 
on how one looks at it, as will be discussed below.  The one area of efficiency is in the 
access that shareholders and institutional investors have to information about corporate 
performance.  They have much better and more direct access, and interestingly, studies 
show that they act to remove inefficient managers at least as quickly as European and 
USA counterparts.222  Another area of efficiency is in the very limited market for 
corporate control, which while supposed to improve market efficiency, is notoriously 
expensive, and of questionable long-term value.223  In Japan, it is nearly non-existent.
last decade has not been as severe, losing only in 2 of the last 10 years, and that the benefit received by the 
average workers is due to government’s public works projects. The Great Unraveling, (2003), at 95.
220
 The rate of Japanese unemployment has reached a record high of 5.2%, something shareholder primacy 
model economies and governments normally only dream of.  Financial Times, April 25, 2003, p. 1 As well, 
this is a source of inefficiency referred to as “excess manpower.”  Kester, op cit n 197, p. 260.
221
 See for example, R. Wade, “Joe Stiglitz’s Bum Rap” (2003) 25:5 Journal of Policy Modeling
222
 Kester, op cit, n. 197, p. 239.
223
 Walker, op cit, n. 199; Kester, op cit, n. 197, p. 239. See for a very thorough specific industry example 
of financial institutions, which should be the best evidence of the claim made for the market for corporate 
control, Robert DeYoung. “Bank mergers, x-efficiency, and the market for corporate control,” (1997) 23 
(1) Managerial Finance. 32, and the general opinion that it does not work as a basis for precluding it from 
developing in Less Developed Countries, in Ajit Singh, Bruce A Weisse. “Emerging stock markets, 
portfolio capital flows and long-term economic growth: Micro and macroeconomic perspectives,” (Apr. 
1998) 26(4) World Development. Oxford  607.
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ii) Drawbacks of the Japanese Model 
The main problem with the Japanese model is that the support provided by the collectivist 
approach makes it difficult to deal effectively with underperforming assets.224 Japanese 
corporate restructurings do not cut costs, or change much in the corporation other than 
the management team.225 Japanese corporations tend to hold onto their cash instead of 
reinvesting it into the economy.226 Furthermore, although not a corporate law problem, 
the Japanese system tends to burden suppliers and entrepreneurs with the debts of failed 
businesses.227  In summary, the argument is that Japanese corporations do not have the 
same level of efficiency in other areas.228
iii) Implications of the Japanese Model for the Future 
The Japanese model offers some very attractive alternatives for keeping an economy and 
society functioning during difficult economic times.  Even more appealingly, the model 
does so without undue stress on the government treasury.  Many governments are not 
wealthy and have difficulty meeting even their basic social security obligations.  
9 VISIONS OF THE FUTURE
a) Peter Drucker
224




 Kester, op cit, n. 197, p. 260.
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Peter Drucker arguably the world’s foremost management theorist, suggests in his 
provocative article, “Will the Corporation Survive? Yes, but not as we know it” that in 
the foreseeable future there will be some profound changes to the corporation.  Drucker 
opines that the corporation will increasingly rely on a few professional managers whose 
power will increase exponentially.  The majority of the work will be out-sourced to 
tightly controlled suppliers.  This “dispersed model” of the corporation poses huge 
challenges for the legal and financial system, not to mention society as a whole.  The 
“dispersed model” with its higher concentration of power and corollary lower level of 
participation exponentially increases the risks of managerial abuse of power, both in 
terms of financial malfeasance, and politically.  
Drucker notes that this “dispersed model” is not completely new and has precedents 
elsewhere.  What is new, however, is the context in which it occurs—a loose non-
affiliated corporate culture.  This dispersed model also has parallels in multinational 
corporations.  They regulatory issues229 raised by multi-nationals may ultimately prove to 
be insurmountable.230  Nevertheless, the multi-national and the regulatory problems they 
pose appear to be here to stay, and if Drucker is correct, we may see more of the same 
type of problem in the domestic market.  Future legal developments must take this into 
account and should be forward looking anticipating some of the issues this will raise.  Of 
course, law is a backwards looking enterprise examining previous cases and old 
doctrines.  This orientation makes the future doubly challenging.
229
 J. Dine, The Governance of Corporate Groups (2000)




Another important business thinker, Michael Jensen, wrote an even more radical article 
entitled, “Eclipse of the Public Corporation”231 about the future of corporations.  While 
Jensen’s predictions have turned out to be nearly completely incorrect—his hypothesis of 
a dramatic increase of leverage buy-outs has not panned out—his article bears merit in 
that it points out the possibilities for a similar concentration of power, although Jensen 
observed that the bought-out corporations were usually returned to the public market 
within a few years.  If such power is available for an extended time in the marketplace, 
what risks does it create for the economy in terms of creating monopolies of power, 
further corruption of government by special interest groups, and concentration of wealth 
and resources.232 These are important issues given the social wealth justification for the 
shareholder primacy model corporation on the one hand and the increasing skewed 
distribution of society’s resources through concentrations on the other.  In any event, law 
has considerable ground to cover both in theory and in its development even to reach 
today, and increasingly central to law’s mandate is the issue of corporate modeling and 
control.
10 CONCLUSION
Each of the models of the corporation is informed by and heavily dependent upon values.  
It is imperative that the values incorporated in each of the models be put forth and made 
230
 See, for example, Dine op cit and J. Dunning, ed. Governments, Globalization, and International 
Business (1999).
231
 M. Jensen, “Eclipse of the Public Corporation” (Sept. Oct 1989), Harvard Business Review, 61.
232
 Interestingly, this concentration has occurred in both Germany and Japan, but perhaps in part because of 
the models discussed, the impact has not been as negative.
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the center of the debate.233  To fail to do so is to permit the incomplete work of the 
positivist neo-classical economist to create a normative vision for society.  It permits the 
considerations of wealth to determine the path of humankind.  A wealth focus offers no 
justice, no hope and ultimately undermines our humanity.  As long as humans hold 
anything other than wealth maximization dear, the need to permit law, indeed to incite 
law, to include other values and form society must exist and the value of economic 
analysis kept in its place. 
233
 As M. Bradley, et al, observe, “The deepest challenge then is to find a way to enact communitarian 
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